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This article compares the existing law of the sea and the United
Nations Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea as they relate to
navigation and other national security considerations. The ex-
isting law is found to be unclear and unsupported by a global
consensus. Without consensus, deployment of naval and air
forces will conflict with States' claims of jurisdiction, involving
territorial seas, straits used for international navigation, archi-
pelagoes, and economic zones. To avoid this conflict or acquies-
cence in unilateral claims, the Draft Convention provides for
essential navigational and other security rights, represents an im-
provement over existing law, and will, upon coming into force,
create a widely accepted system of international law for the
oceans.
INTRODUCTION
Coastal-State assertions of jurisdiction over maritime areas
have been expanding over the years. These claims, of both a geo-
graphical and functional nature, have been advanced by devel-
oped and developing States, by major maritime and other States,
and by friend and foe alike. The claims are numerous, varied, and
often at odds with one another. Their most serious impact is on
the traditional freedoms of navigation and overflight and related
* Senior resident partner in the Washington Office of Milbank, Tweed, Had-
ley, and McCloy; head of the U.S. delegation to the Third United Nations Confer-
ence on the Law of the Sea 1977-80; Public Chairman of the Advisory Committee to
the delegation, 1980 to date. In the preparation of this article, the author has been
ably assisted by George Taft, Esq., Attorney Advisor in the U.S. Department of
State and former Director of the Law of the Sea Office.
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and associated legitimate, uses of the seas; they raise serious
questions relating to the inobility, flexibility, and credibility in
peacetime of our general purpose forces in the face of a lack of a
global consensus on ocean law.
The lack of consensus may be demonstrated by the fact that of
the 137 independent coastal States, 24 claim a three-nautical-mile
territorial sea, 79 claim a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea and 26
claim more than 12 nautical miles. Most States bordering key
straits used for international navigation claim territorial seas in
excess of three nautical miles, thus between them claiming sover-
eignty over the entire strait and eliminating the high-seas corridor
throughout it. A number of island States claim archipelagic sta-
tus, drawing baselines connecting the outermost points of their
outermost islands and declaring the waters landward thereto sub-
ject to their sovereignty. Fifty-four States claim 200-nautical-mile
economic zones, some of which purport to restrict navigation and
overflight. And this is merely an illustrative listing.1
These and other extensions of jurisdiction have inexorably in-
creased the likelihood that deployments of naval and air forces
will come into conflict with coastal-State claims. Our choices in
such a situation are uncomfortable ones. We may decide to chal-
lenge the claims that we do not recognize, and in that event we
must be prepared to pay the potential economic and political
costs as well as the military costs. If our policy is to be reason-
ably consistent, the costs will be cumulative. It is worth recalling
in this regard that friends and allies of the United States border
many key sea areas and claim jurisdiction not recognized by the
United States.2 We may decide to avoid these costs; but this
would constrain the mobility of our forces and the credibility of
our will to use them, while at the same time erode by non-prac-
tice the very principles of customary international law we seek to
defend and advance. It has been suggested that we might attempt
to avoid the dilemma of chaos or acquiescence by attempting to
negotiate bilateral or regional agreements, recognizing our right
to navigate through or overfly a State's claimed waters or air-
space. The difficulties in such an approach are manifest; success
depends upon the relations between the parties and other polit-
ical factors, including treaty entanglements with a superpower di-
rectly related to the superpower's national security requirements.
1. OFFICE OF THE GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEPT OF STATE, LImTs iN THE SEAs (No.
36 4th rev. 1981).
2. For example, Indonesia claims archipelagic status with a restrictive navi-
gation and overflight regime as well as a 12-nautical-mile territorial sea. Spain,
Morocco, and Oman claim 12-nautical-mile territorial seas which overlap key
straits.
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In the case of the United States, the price that may be exacted in
the form of economic, political, or economic concessions could be
exorbitant, especially if we have to conclude a number of agree-
ments. The superpowers could thus be encouraged to compete
with each other for influence over strategically located coastal
States; and not only would the coastal States be caught in the
crunch, but the very consistency in customary international law
that we seek would thus be undermined rather than advanced.
The only satisfactory solution of this dilemma is the develop-
ment of a new consensus regarding the rules of ocean law that is
compatible with the mobility, flexibility, and credibility of routine
global deployments of our forces. The codification and develop-
ment of the international law of the sea, particularly regarding na-
tional security matters, will yield clarity in the law and enhanced
authority for it. This objective is well served by the Draft Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea3 as it relates to navigation and
overflight and related and associated uses of the seas. It reflects a
new consensus that will, should a treaty be adopted, represent a
major and successful effort to arrest the trend toward chaos and
replace it with a synthesis combining the codification of extensive
State practice, precedent, doctrine, and law with the innovative
development of new legal principles.
TERRITORIAL SEA
The coastal State's sovereignty has historically extended
throughout the breadth of its territorial sea. Indeed, there seems
to be no doubt that the rights that may be exercised by a coastal
State in its territorial sea are the same as those that may be exer-
cised within its land territory, except that the sovereignty of the
coastal State is subject to the right of innocent passage by foreign
flag vessels.4
The principle of coastal-State sovereignty was incorporated in
the following articles of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and
3. Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.78/Rev. 4,
art. 312(2) (Aug. 28, 1981).
4. See Report of ILC covering the work of its Eighth Session, 23 April - 4 July,
1956, U.N. Doc./A3159, also in U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 9) 12 (1956); [1956] 2 Y.B.
Int'l L Comm'n 265; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.4/SER. A/1956 (a commentary on the is-
sue of sovereignty). In light of the sparse legislative history on this subject at the
Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea and similar language of pertinent arti-
cles, the ILC Commentary is particularly useful.
the Contiguous Zone,5 which emerged from the First United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1958:
article 1
1. The sovereignty of a State extends beyond its land territory and its in-
ternal waters, to a belt of sea adjacent to its coast, described as the territo-
rial sea.
2. This sovereignty is exercised subject to the provisions of these articles
and to other rules of international law.
article 2
The sovereignty of a coastal State extends to the air space over the territo-
rial sea as well as to its bed and subsoil.6
Article 2 of the Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea also in-
corporates this principle of sovereignty but adds an innovation in
international law, i.e., the concept of archipelagic waters.7 This
article reads as follows:
Legal status of the territorial sea, of the air space over the territorial sea
and of its bed and subsoil
1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory
and internal waters and, in the case of an archipelagic State, its archipe-
lagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea.
2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over the territorial sea as
well as to its bed and subsoil.
3. The sovereignty over the territorial sea is exercised subject to this
Convention and to other rules of international law.8
While there is no dispute under existing international law re-
garding the status of the waters of the territorial sea, the same
cannot be said as to the maximum permissible breadth of the ter-
ritorial sea. At the Hague Conference for the Progressive Codifi-
cation of International Law in 1930, there seemed to be broad,
although not unanimous, support for the traditional three-mile
maximum breadth of the territorial sea.9 Nevertheless, that Con-
ference did not adopt a provision on the subject. A number of
5. Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, done April 29,
1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606, TJ.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force for the
United States Sept. 10, 1964).
6. Id.
7. See notes 47-56 and accompanying text infra.
8. See supra note 5, art. 2.
9. For the United States, Secretary of State Jefferson informed the British
Minister that while the '"ltimate extent" of the territorial sea was reserved "for
further deliberations," the 3-mile or one "sea league" limit was not opposable by
any nation. Note dated Nov. 18, 1793, in 1 Moor, INT'L L DIGEST 702-03 (1906). The
United States has consistently adhered to the 3-mile limit as the maximum
breadth of the territorial sea it would recognize. See Cunard Steamship Co. v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 100, at 122-23 (1923):
It now is settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere that the
territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the land areas under its do-
minion and control, the ports, harbors, bays, and other inclosed arms of
the sea along its coast and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the
coast line outward a marine league, or 3 geographic miles.
Id.
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States thereafter made claims to broader limits of sovereignty
with the aim either of controlling fishing or of asserting more gen-
eral national claims.
In 1958, on the eve of the First United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea, a statistical breakdown of territorial-sea
claims produced the following tabulation:












That Conference failed, however, to reach agreement on the maxi-
mum limit of the territorial sea, as did the Second United Nations
Conference in 1960. The trend away from the three-mile limit ac-
celerated, as shown in the following graph:
10. Office of the Geographer, U.S. Dep't of State.
TERRroRILAL SEA CLAIMS: 1958-197911
(Nautical Miles)
Years
As late as the 1950's, the three-mile limit was broadly reflected
in State practice. It could thus be regarded as among the rules of
customary international law that have "grown up by common con-
sent of the States-that is, the different States have acted in such
a manner as to imply their tacit consent to these rules."' 2 As
stated in the Asylum13 case:
The Party which relies on a custom.. .must prove that this custom is es-
tablished in such a manner that it has become binding on the other
Party..., that the rule invoked . is in accordance with a constant and
uniform usage practised by the States in question, and that this usage is
the expression of a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a
duty incumbent on the territorial State.14
Although more recent trends have weakened the standing of the
11. Id.
12. L OPPENHEIM, 1 INTERNATIONAL LAw 17 (8th ed. 1955).
13. [1950] LCJ. 266.
14. Id. at 276.
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three-mile limit, the proponents of a broader limit cannot avoid
the strictures of international law.
The delimitation of sea areas has always an international aspect; it cannot
be dependent merely upon the will of the coastal State as expressed in its
municipal law. Although it is true that the act of delimitation is necessar-
ily a unilateral act, because only the coastal State is competent to under-
take it, the validity of the delimitation with regard to other States depends
upon international law.15
One need not fully argue the question whether the current
maximum permissible breadth of the territorial sea is three miles
or 12 miles to recognize that there is no longer a consensus on the
matter in the world community. It seems clear, on the other
hand, that there is scant support for the proposition that the terri-
torial sea may as a matter of law extend beyond 12 miles.16
The Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea provides for a
maximum limit of 12 miles.'7 Indeed, this limit, as the only basis
for agreement, was variously linked by participating States to
agreement on passage through straits used for international navi-
gation, coastal State rights in an economic zone, or other ele-
ments of "the package deal."
Under customary international law as well as the Draft Conven-
tion, navigation in the territorial sea is regulated by the regime of
innocent passage, which is the one exception to complete coastal
State sovereignty.
The right of innocent passage seems to be the result of an attempt to rec-
oncile the freedom of ocean navigation with the theory of territorial wa-
ters. While recognizing the necessity of granting to littoral States a zone
of waters along the coast, the family of nations was unwilling to prejudice
the newly gained freedom on the seas. As a general principle, the right of
innocent passage requires no supporting argument or citation of authority;
it is firmly established in international law ... 18
The conflicting interests surrounding coastal-State rights 'and in-
nocent passage have been succinctly stated:
All claims by coastal states to exercise authority affecting access to the
marginal belt, and the opposing counterclaims by other states to be free of
such authority, bring into conflict the two fundamental policies that have
traditionally been of paramount importance in disputes about use of the
oceans of the world. In protection of widely recognized common interests,
15. Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v. Norway) [1951] LCJ. 116, 132.
16. See, e.g., Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, supra
note 5, art. 24, para. 2: 'The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 12 miles from
the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured."
17. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art 3.
18. P. JESSUP, THE LAW oF TERRroRIAL WATERS AND MALrrIum JURISDICTION
120 (1927).
it has long been general community policy.. .to maintain the oceans as a
common resource available for the peaceful use by all for the purposes of
transportation and communication. Because, in varying degree, the terri-
torial seas of coastal states must be utilized in this transportation and
communication, the community is also concerned that passage through
these areas be preserved free of undue coastal restrictions.19
The 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous.
Zone states that "ships of all States ... shall enjoy the right of
innocent passage through the territorial sea."20 "Passage is inno-
cent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or se-
curity of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in
conformity with these articles and with other rules of interna-
tional law."21 "Submarines are required to navigate on the sur-
face and to show their flag."22
Although that Convention does not purport to codify customary
international law, the provisions cited above are accepted as cus-
tomary law if we may judge by State practice, including its reflec-
tion in the legislation of coastal States. Innocent passage is a
"subjective" regime in so far as the Convention leaves open to
coastal-State interpretation the question of what activities are in-
nocent or noninnocent. Indeed, there is the danger that "1inno-
cence" can be interpreted on the basis of the flag the vessel is
flying, the cargo it is carrying, its means of propulsion, or its desti-
nation, although any such interpretation is open to scrutiny and
thus to correction by the community of nations. And since the
concept of innocent passage evolved before the development of
the airplane or submarine, it does not embrace the right to overfly
or navigate submerged through the territorial sea.
The Draft Convention's provisions on innocent passage are a
major improvement. While excluding submerged transit or over-
flight, they enumerate the activities of ships which are prejudicial
to the peace, good order, or security of the coastal State, thus re-
moving the vessel from innocent passage. 23 There is a new provi-
sion on the laws and regulations of the coastal State relating to
innocent passage. The right of innocent passage by nuclear-pow-
ered ships and ships carrying nuclear substances is explicitly rec-
ognized.24 There is a prohibition on discrimination in form or in
fact against the ships of any State or against ships carrying car-
goes to, from, or on behalf of any State.25 Unlike the 1958 Conven-
19. M. McDouGAL & W. BuRKE, TnE PuBrc ORDER OF THE OcEANs 184-85
(1962).
20. Supra note 5, art. 14, para. 1.
21. Id. art. 14, para. 4.
22. Id. art. 14, para. 6.
23. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 19, para. 2.
24. Id. art. 23.
25. Id. art. 24, para. l(b).
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tion, the Draft Convention explicitly embraces the immunities of
warships in the territorial sea.26 In sum, the Draft Convention
provisions on the territorial sea will make an important contribu-
tion to the codification, clarification, and development of ocean
law, thereby benefiting coastal States and flag States alike.
STRArrs USED FOR ThERNATIONAL NAVIGATION
The legal status of straits used for international navigation is,
with the exception of straits subject to special treaty arrange-
ments, based upon general rules of international law with respect
to internal waters, the territorial sea, or the high seas. However,
to recognize coastal-State rights in straits to be as broad and en-
compassing as coastal-State rights in the territorial sea outside of
straits would be tantamount to granting a license to interfere with
interests in trade and communications that are essential to all
States and would substantially impair freedom of navigation on
the high seas.
Prominent publicists early in this century maintained that
straits used for international navigation should be open2 7 to all
ships, including warships.28 By the time the First United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea was held in Geneva in 1958, the
right of all ships to innocent passage through territorial straits
used for international navigation was well recognized. Many pub-
licists, however, maintained that coastal States might, at least in
extraordinary circumstances, subject warships to broader regula-
tion than would be permissible for merchant ships. 29 Moreover,
the International Court of Justice stated in the Corfu Channel
Case30:
It is, in the opinion of the Court, generally recognized and in accordance
with international custom that States in time of peace have a right to send
their warships through straits used for international navigation between
two parts of the high seas without the previous authorization of a coastal
State, provided that the passage is innocent. Unless otherwise prescribed
in an international convention, there is no right for a coastal State to pro-
hibit such passage through straits in time of peace....
26. Id. art. 32, but see Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone, supra note 5, sub-sections C & D.
27. E. BROEL, 1 INTERNATIONAL STArrs 79 (1947).
28. Id. at 230; JEssup, supra note 18, at 120.
29. See, e.g., BomNILs MANUEL DE DRorr INTERNATIONAL PuInLc 406 (Fauchille,
ed. 1912); BRUEL, upra note 27, at 232; BuSTAmANTE, THE TERrIORIAL SEA 120
(1930); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 464 (7th ed., Lauterpacht, 1948).
30. (United Kingdom v. Albania) [1949] I.C.T. 28, 29.
The Court is of opinion that Albania, in view of these exceptional circum-
stances, would have been justified in issuing regulations in respect of the
passage of warships through the Strait, but not in prohibiting such pas-
sage or in subjecting it to the requirement of special authorization.3 1
The Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone
specifically addresses straits in only one paragraph. It provides:
"There shall be no suspension of the innocent passage of foreign
ships through straits which are used for international navigation
between one part of the high seas and another part of the high
seas or the territorial sea of a foreign State."3 2
In all other respects the regime of innocent passage through
straits is the same as the regime in the territorial sea outside of
straits. Thus, under the 1958 Convention, there is no right of sub-
merged passage or overflight through territorial straits. There is a
right of the coastal State to regulate passage unilaterally, pro-
vided that such regulation does "not hamper innocent passage
through the territorial sea."33 While acceptable so long as cus-
tomary international law confined the territorial sea to the his-
toric three-mile limit, extension of the territorial sea to 12 miles
would make this regime inadequate to support the requirements
of the international community with regard to certainty of the
rights of their ships and aircraft to carry on trade and communi-
cation or military activities, vital to the peace and stability of the
world community. Such an extension would overlap more than
100 straits between six miles and 24 miles in width. With a three-
mile territorial sea, these straits embraced a high-seas corridor.
From the outset of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, the United States conditioned its willingness to
agree to a 12-mile territorial sea upon obtaining recognition of a
treaty right to unimpeded transit through, under, and over straits
used for international navigation. Without clear recognition of
such a right, it might have been possible for the States bordering
straits to assert that the right of innocent passage applied even to
such strategically important straits as Gibraltar.
The traditional doctrine of innocent passage was premised on a
narrow territorial sea. This both accounted for and made tolera-
ble the fact that innocent passage does not countenance either
submerged transit by submarines or overflight by aircraft. It also
made possible the avoidance of an agreed international under-
standing as to what passage is "innocent." A consequence was
the lingering danger of subjective interpretation of "innocence,"
which was defined as passage that is not prejudicial to the "peace,
31. Id.
32. Supra note 5, art. 16, para. 4.
33. Id. note 5, art. 15, para. 1.
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good order or security" of the coastal State. Some strait States
had asserted, for example, that the transit of large petroleum
tankers or nuclear-powered vessels was inherently "non-
innocent."
But it never made sense to apply to international straits a legal
doctrine developed to govern passage in the territorial sea gener-
ally. As the United States declared when substantive negotia-
tions were getting underway at the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea in 1974:
Unlike the territorial sea in general, international straits serve as access
and connecting points for large areas of the oceans. As such, transit
through straits is essential to meaningful exercise of the high seas rights
of all states in these vast areas. Functionally, then, straits are quite dis-
tinct from other territorial sea areas. And because of their special promi-
nence, the potential for conflict from an uncertain legal regime is greatly
increased in straits.34
Of course in practice, major maritime States have not accepted
the regime of article 16, paragraph 4, of the 1958 Convention, at
least as applied to major straits. "[Tihe approach adopted by
many States in 1958 to deal with this problem was to oppose ex-
tensions of coastal state sovereignty beyond three nautical
miles. '35 Many States bordering key straits have nevertheless
purported to extend their territorial seas to 12 miles, without pro-
viding an exception to the innocent passage regime which they
have apparently continued to regard as applicable. This has been
the announced position of Spain and Morrocco toward the Strait
of Gibraltar, and of Oman and Iran toward the Strait of Hormuz.
In these and many other straits used for international navigation,
the littoral powers are allies or friends of the United States. We
can ignore or openly contest the claims of non-friends and dis-
count in some cases the price we may pay, but persistent chal-
lenges to a friend on an issue of importance to both States can in
the long run incur serious costs.
The Draft Convention approaches transit passage in a practical
manner. Reflecting the practice of major maritime States, the
Draft Convention distinguishes the regime of transit passage from
the regime of innocent passage. The transit passage regime ap-
plies to straits used for international navigation between one part
34. Special Report of the U.N. Law of the Sea Conference, OIL of Media Serv-
ices, Bureau of Pub. Aff, 70 DEPT STATE BuLL 398 (1974).
35. Oxman, The Third United Nation's Conference on the Law of the Sea: The
1977 New York Session, 72 AM. J. LW'L L. 57, 63 (1978).
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone and another part
of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone.36 The innocent
passage regime applies to straits used for international navigation
between a part of the high seas or an exclusive economic zone
and the territorial sea of a foreign State and to certain other
straits excluded from the regime of transit passage.37
Moreover, Part III of the Draft Convention (Straits Used for In-
ternational Navigation) lays down detailed rules for straits, but
these do not apply to the territorial sea outside of straits. Indeed,
article 45 is the only one which addresses innocent passage
through straits, and this article deals exclusively with straits not
subject to the transit passage regime. Furthermore, it is clear on
the face of Part III that it, rather than Part I1 (Territorial Sea and
Contiguous Zone) which defines innocent passage, governs pas-
sage through straits.38 This approach, which is in sharp contrast
with the 1958 Convention, affirmatively recognizes the unique im-
portance of straits.
The transit passage regime provided for in the Draft Conven-
tion permits both overflight and submerged transit. Overflight is
explicitly recognized in article 38, paragraph 2, which is the right
of transit passage, including "the freedom of ... overflight
.... ,,39 The 1958 Convention recognizes no such right or freedom
except to the extent that freedom of navigation and overflight
may be exercised on the high seas beyond the territorial sea, both
in straits and otherwise.40
It is equally clear, although less explicitly so, that the transit
passage regime provided for in the Draft Convention includes a
right of submerged transit for submarines. The right of transit
passage includes "the freedom of navigation ... solely for the
purpose of continuous and expeditious transit of the strait
.... ,,41 The term "freedom of navigation" antedates the 1958
Convention on the High Seas and has always been understood as
including submerged passage. The transposition of freedom of
navigation to straits is limited only by the other provisions of Part
III and by other rules of international law such as, for example,
those deriving from the Charter of the United Nations. The Draft
36. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 37.
37. Id. note 3, art. 45.
38. As to the regulatory powers of the States bordering straits, see, e.g., Draft
Convention, supra note 3, arts. 41, 42 (Part I) & 233 (Part XI).
39. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 38, para. 2. See also explicit recogni-
tion of overflight in id. art. 38, para. 1 and id. art. 39, para. 3.
40. Convention on the High Seas, done April 28, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.A.S.
No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82, arts. 1, 2 (entered into force for the United States Septem-
ber 30, 1962).
41. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 38, para. 2.
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Convention's only limitations on the exercise of freedom of navi-
gation are those found in articles 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42. The Con-
vention nowhere contains an explicit or implicit prohibition on
submerged transit of straits.42 The conclusion that no such limita-
tion was intended is reinforced by the fact that the part of the
Draft Convention (Part II) dealing with the territorial sea explic-
itly provides in article 20 that submarines are "required to navi-
gate on the surface and to show their flag." Nothing of the sort
appears in Part II. In addition, article 39(c) restrains ships from
activities other than their "normal mode" of transit. This phrase
is also used in article 53, paragraph 3, with respect to archipelagic
sealanes passage. As thus newly introduced into the law of sea
lexicon, the phrase is widely viewed as embracing submerged
transit.
The transit passage regime provided for in the Draft Conven-
tion delineates the obligations of ships and aircraft during the
course of transit passage43 while at the same time circumscribing
the rights of the coastal State with regard to transit passage.44
The sovereign immunity of ships and aircraft entitled thereto is
explicitly recognized.45 As I have earlier pointed out:
The provisions.. .emphasize the obligations of transiting states rather
than the right of coastal states to control transit. This approach is
designed to protect legitimate coastal state interests without permitting
coastal state interference with transit... [T~he only significant excep-
tions pertain to enforcement of internationally approved maritime safety
and pollution measures4 6
In sum, the transit passage regime of the Draft Convention will
satisfactorily protect and enhance the legal regime in straits that
is essential for the continued mobility and flexibility of air and na-
val forces. It can be seen as a major improvement when viewed
against the ambiguity of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial
Sea and Contiguous Zone and against the existing lack of agree-
ment on the maximum breadth of the territorial sea. Its signifi-
cance, moreover, is highlighted by the fact that all but a very few
States have indicated their willingness to accept the transit pas-
42. See Moore, The Regime of Straits and the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea, 74 AM. J. INT'L L. 77, 95-102 (1980).
43. Draft Convention, supra note 3, arts. 39, 40, 41 and 42.
44. Id. note 3, arts. 41, 42 and 233.
45. Id. note 3, art. 42, para. 5.
46. Remarks of E. Richardson at the launching of the U.S.S. Samuel E. Mori-
son, Bath, Maine (July 14, 1979) [Dep't State, Press Release No. 171, July 13, 1979]
(on file with the author).
sage regime so long as it remains part of a comprehensive Law of
the Sea Convention which brings them compensating benefits.
ARCHIPELAGOES
While there has been for years a general recognition that island
nations should have jurisdictional rights equivalent to those of
continental nations, it has never been acknowledged that islands
should have greater rights. In recent decades, however, a number
of island nations, led by Indonesia and the Philippines, have
pressed for recognition of the concept of an "archipelagic State."
Although the concept had little support before 1958, and the First
United Nations Conference did not accept it, these island nations
have since embodied a claim of archipelagic status in national leg-
islation. They have drawn baselines connecting the outermost
points of their outermost islands and claimed the waters thus en-
closed, which had been traditionally viewed as part of the high
seas, as "internal waters" or waters otherwise subject to coastal-
State sovereignty, thereby purporting to subject them to at least
the same degree of sovereignty as that exercisable over the terri-
torial sea.47 It was to be expected that resistance to the concept
would spring from the fact that in some cases the waters for
which archipelagic status was claimed were not only vast in area
like the Java Sea, but covered key straits and navigation and over-
flight routes critical to the movement of military forces. More-
over, the claims sometimes had the effect of separating two parts
of a neighboring State, as is the case with Indonesia's claim as it
affects Malaysia. Furthermore, there was a deep concern that the
concept would be applied by non-island nations with untoward
political effects.
Indonesia, the Philippines, Fiji, the Solomon Islands, Sao Tome
and Principe, and Cape Verde now claim archipelagic status; and
other island nations are likely to do so in the next few years at
most. It was apparent at the Third United Nations Conference
that the claimants would not withdraw or modify their claims in
the absence of a treaty that met their legitimate interests in bol-
stering the unity and integrity of their nations. It was also appar-
ent, insofar as the object of the Conference was a comprehensive
treaty, that a deal had to be struck with the archipelagic concept's
main proponents, which, like Indonesia and the Philippines, were
47. The Philippines law is: An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial
Sea of the Philippines, Republic Act. No. 3046, approved June 17, 1961, amended by
Republic Act No. 5446, Sept. 18, 1968. Among other things, this Act declares waters
landward of the baselines to be internal. The Indonesian law is Law No. 4 (Feb.
18, 1960), and waters inside baselines are called "internal waters."
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and are important friends of the United States. Hence, although
the Indonesian and Philippines legislation is among the most re-
strictive with regard to navigation, it could not be assimilated by a
comprehensive treaty without damage to the global interest in
communications and trade and without impairing the freedoms of
navigation and overflight. As defined in a universal convention,
the concept of archipelagic waters had to be accommodated with
these interests as well as with the concerns of neighboring States.
It was also essential to confine its application in such a way as to
avoid the serious political problems that would otherwise have
been precipitated.
The Draft Convention provides a practical and political solution
that commands general support within the context of an accepta-
ble treaty. The concept applies only to island States.4 While an
archipelagic State may draw archipelagic baselines joining the
outermost points of the outermost islands, they are subject to
specific geographic limitations.4 9 The system of baselines may
not be applied in such a way as to cut off from the high seas or
economic zone the territorial sea of another State. 0 If part of the
archipelagic waters lies between two parts of an immediately ad-
jacent neighboring State, the existing rights and all other legiti-
mate interests which the latter State has traditionally exercised
in such waters will survive and must be respected.51
The waters landward of the baselines are archipelagic waters
under the sovereignty of the archipelagic State subject to the pro-
visions of Part IV (Archipelagic States) of the Draft Convention.52
(The territorial sea and other seaward extensions of jurisdiction
are measured from these archipelagic baselines.) The most sig-
nificant limitation of sovereignty over archipelagic waters is that
preserving the right of all ships and aircraft of foreign States to
enjoy continuous, expeditious, and unobstructed transit in, over,
and under sealanes and air routes which traverse the archipelagic
waters and innocent passage in the adjacent territorial sea.5 3
These sealanes, which are defined by courses and distances from
48. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art 48. Greece could not, in consequence,
claim archipelagic status for the Greek Islands nor could the United States do so
for Hawaii.
49. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 47.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. art. 49.
53. Id. art. 53.
a point of entry into and a point of exit from the archipelagic wa-
ters and which extend 25 miles on each side of this axis, must be
approved by the competent international organization before they
are applied by the archipelagic State.54
The right of passage through archipelagic sealanes is at least as
broad with respect to navigation and overflight as is transit pas-
sage through straits. The analysis of the straits regime5 5 is perti-
nent here. It is understood, moreover, in recognition of the broad
expanse of what is now high seas that would fall under national
sovereignty, that the wide sealanes permit transiting ships and
aircraft to be deployed as they would be on the high seas.
Outside of sealanes but within archipelagic waters, all ships of all
States enjoy the right of innocent passage. This right of innocent
passage is as broad and subject to the same limitations as in the
territorial sea.56
While the claims of archipelagic status put forward by several
nations have no basis in international law today, they are suffi-
ciently numerous and in some cases embrace such important ar-
eas of the world as to warrant an international consensus
agreement on a circumscribed definition of archipelagic waters,
coupled with a liberal regime of navigation and overflight.
EcoNoMIc ZONE/HIGH SEAS
Hugo Grotius in 1609 set forth the thesis that the freedom of the
seas was part of international law; the open seas were not capable
of being divided and could not be appropriated for exclusive use
by any nation.57 For over three centuries, it has been clear that
the high seas cannot be subject to the sovereignty of any State.
The only limitations on the principle of freedom of the seas were
those which recognized the unilateral right of States to deal with
customs, fiscal, immigration, and health matters, as well as slav-
ery and piracy.
Triggered by the Truman Proclamation of 1945,58 resource
claims encroaching on the high seas have since proliferated. The
reaction of States to such claims has rested on their perceived
reasonableness and on their potential for direct or indirect harm
to other States. Albeit gradually and grudgingly, these claims
54. Id. The competent organization is understood to be the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO).
55. See notes 36-46 and accompanying text supra.
56. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 52.
57. IL GROTtuS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS 8 (R. Magoflan transl. 1916).
58. See Richardson, Power, Mobility, and the Law of the Sea, 58 FoREiGN AFF.
902, 903-04 (1980).
[voL. 19: 553, 19821 Law of the Sea
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
have won general acceptance. Extensions of more general claims
of sovereignty to wide areas of the seas have traditionally been
resisted, in part because they conflicted implicitly or explicitly
with the freedom of communication which affected all-States, and
in part because they transcended any reasonable requirement for
the protection of the coastal State's legitimate interests.
The Geneva Convention on the High Seas,59 which was the only
one of the four Conventions adopted by the First United Nations
Conference that explicitly purported to codify rules of interna-
tional law, set forth the freedoms of the high seas in a broad and
non-exhaustive way. Article 2 provides in part:
The high seas being open to all nations, no State may validly purport to
subject any part of them to its sovereignty. Freedom of the high seas is
exercised under the conditions laid down by these articles and by the
other rules of international law. It comprises, inter alia, both for coastal
and non-coastal States:
(1) Freedom of navigation;
(2) Freedom of fishing;
(3) Freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines;
(4) Freedom to fly over the high seas.60
In its final sentence, article 2 gives recognition to the interests of
other States as follows: 'These freedoms, and others which are
recognized by the general principles of international law, shall be
exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas."61
Despite the High Seas Convention, unilateral claims of sover-
eignty and jurisdiction in the high seas have multiplied since 1958.
The invalidity of some of these claims as a matter of international
law is obvious-for example, territorial sea claims of 200 miles-
and need not be elaborated. Other claims are more difficult to
evaluate on the basis of objective criteria. The Third United Na-
tions Conference on the Law of the Sea had by 1975 already
achieved a consensus on the establishment of a 200-mile "exclu-
sive economic zone" as part of a broadly accepted package deal,
thereby inducing many countries to assert jurisdiction over the
resources within 200 miles of their coasts. Is the economic zone
or certain commonly ascribed attributes of such a zone in accord
with the law of nations?
59. Convention on the High Seas, done at Geneva April 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312,
TIA.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (entered into force for the United States Septem-
ber 30, 1962).
60. Id. art. 2.
61. Id.
The United States, for example, does not claim an economic
zone nor does it recognize such zones as such. At the same time,
the United States claims broad and exclusive fisheries jurisdiction
to a limit of 200 nautical miles and, in the case of anadromous
species of fish-in particular, salmon-to an unspecified limit
which may range hundreds of miles beyond that limit.62 Coastal
State fisheries jurisdiction to 200 miles is an attribute of economic
zones. It is in contravention, however, of article 2 of the High
Seas Convention. Many other States, which like the United
States are parties to that Convention, claim similar jurisdiction
within the 200-mile area.63 In the case of the United States legis-
lation, the jurisdictional point is met by the conclusion of bilateral
agreements with foreign fishing States whereby they agree to rec-
ognize our assertion of authority over the zone.
The introduction of new technology and new uses of the seas
has led to certain other claims of jurisdiction to activities in, or ar-
eas of, what has traditionally been the high seas. The United
States, for example, claims jurisdiction over the production of en-
ergy through utilizing the differential in water temperatures be-
tween the surface and the depths (ocean thermal energy
conversion, or "OTEC"). This jurisdiction is narrowly drawn and
is not exclusive, but it is an attribute of an economic zone. The
United States likewise claims jurisdiction over deepwater ports
beyond the territorial sea. While this too is a normal attribute of
an economic zone, the deployment of such ports can be viewed as
a high-seas freedom, with jurisdiction over the vessels using them
accounted for by the port-State doctrine. Suffice it to say that the
United States and many other States have staked out claims of ju-
risdiction to activities in, or areas of, what has traditionally been
the high seas. This encroachment was inevitable, given the intro-
duction of new technology and new uses of the seas; but it is
sometimes in clear derogation of the traditional high seas
freedoms.
The "reasonable regard" standard in article 2 of the High Seas
Convention recognizes that accommodations are necessary in
practice between and among high seas freedoms exercised by all
States. However, the Convention did not envision a plethora of
new claims and is silent on the relationship of high-seas claims
62. Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1882
(1980).
63. OFFICE or Tm GEOGRAPHER, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Lns IN THE SE.s (No.
36 4th rev. 1981) [as updated by National Maritime Claims as of Jan. 1, 1982]. Of
the States that have claimed 200-mile fisheries zone jurisdiction, a substantial
number have claimed such jurisdiction since 1976. Examples of such claims in-
clude Mexico, Canada, Soviet Union, United States, Japan, and Venezuela.
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and coastal-State rights. For most States, coastal-State rights are
the predominant concern. For others, including the United
States, emphasis is also placed on the freedoms of navigation and
overflight and other legitimate uses of the seas by third States.
It followed quite naturally that at the Third United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, the issue of the legal status of
the economic zone revolved around the position of the United
States and the Soviet Union and their respective allies, which "re-
garded the [economic] zone as a part of the high seas subject to
certain coastal state rights and jurisdiction,"64 and the position of
those countries which regarded the zone as neither territorial sea
nor high seas but as sui generis. Indeed, States which-like Bra-
zil, Peru, and Ecuador--claimed broad territorial seas, pressed to
make the zone one of national jurisdiction where navigation, over-
flight, and other community rights were limited.
The struggle over this issue was at its height when in 1977, at
the Sixth Session of the Third United Nations Conference, a rep-
resentative group of affected States held informal but intensive
negotiations outside the Conference framework on the status of
the zone. These negotiations also dealt with issues involving
marine scientific research and dispute settlement for fisheries.
The resulting texts, which embodied compromises on all three is-
sues and with changes only in the science articles, were incorpo-
rated in the composite text that emerged at the end of the Sixth
Session.65 The language clarifying the relative rights of coastal
States and other States in the seas beyond the territorial sea to
the 200-mile limit has continued to be incorporated in successive
drafts with only slight modifications by the Drafting Committee.
Article 56 provides for the rights, jurisdiction and duties of the
coastal State in the 200-mile economic zone, as follows:
1. In the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State has:
(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserv-
ing and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of
the sea-bed and subsoil and the superjacent waters, and with regard to
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone,
such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;
(b) jurisdiction as provided for in the relevant provisions of the present
Convention with regard to:
(i) the establishment and use of artificial islands, installations and
structures;
64. Oxman, supra note 35, at 67.
65. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 56.
(ii) marine scientific research;
(iii) the protection and preservation of the marine environment;
(c) other rights and duties provided for in the present Convention.
2. In exercising its rights and performing its duties under this Conven-
tion in the exclusive economic zone, the coastal State shall have due re-
gard to the rights and duties of other States and shall act in a manner
compatible with the provisions of this Convention.
3. The rights set out in this article with respect to the sea-bed and sub-
soil shall be exercised in accordance with Part V.L66
This article summarizes coastal State rights. While subpara-
graph l(a) directly confers sovereign rights on the coastal State
for various economic purposes, subparagraphs 1(b) and 1(c) refer
to jurisdiction and other rights and duties specifically provided for
elsewhere in the Convention. Taken together, article 56 and the
articles to which it refers incorporate State practice regarding
fisheries and make detailed provision for additional coastal-State
rights. Thus, the ambiguities resulting from the co-existence of
the 1958 Convention and inconsistent State practice are replaced
by a carefully dovetailed set of provisions which seem satisfacto-
rily to accommodate coastal-State interests.
The coastal State, however, in exercising its rights and perform-
ing its duties in the exclusive economic zone, is required to have
due regard to the rights and duties of other States and to act in a
manner compatible with the Convention. Thus, in contrast with
the silence of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, coastal
States' rights (rather than only high seas freedoms) must be ex-
ercised with a degree of regard for other States. Under article 55,
the zone is subject to the specific legal regime established in Part
V;67 the rights, jurisdiction, and freedoms of coastal States and
other States are governed by the relevant provisions of the Con-
vention. By thus placing the zone in the context of the Draft Con-
vention as a whole, article 55 draws attention to the two sources
of limitation on coastal-State rights in the zone: first, the specific-
ity of their enumeration and, second, their subjection to the due
regard and compatibility provision. These limiting provisions,
which have no counterpart in any pre-existing Convention, are re-
inforced by the cross-reference in article 58(2) to article 89,68 the
effect of which is that no State may validly purport to subject any
part of the exclusive economic zone to its sovereignty.
Article 58 was the subject of particularly difficult negotiations in
the informal group. Every word and comma was exposed to in-
tensive debate. It was understood from the outset that the will-
ingness of the maritime States to back off of their insistence on
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. art. 58(2).
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explicit high-seas status for the exclusive economic zone must be
compensated for by coastal State recognition that the high-seas
freedoms exercisable in the zone are qualitatively and quantita-
tively the same as the traditional high-seas freedoms recognized
by international law. The quantitative objective required that, ex-
cept for former freedoms (e.g., fishing) recognized as coastal-
State rights in the zone, the freedoms exercisable in the zone be
the same in character and content as the traditional high-seas
freedoms. The quantitative objective required that the included
uses of the sea embrace a range no less complete-and allow for
future uses no less inclusive-than traditional high-seas free-
doms. As finally hammered out, article 58 reads:
Rights and duties of other States in the exclusive economic zone
1. In the exclusive economic zone, all States, whether coastal or land-
locked, enjoy, subject to the relevant provisions of this Convention, the
freedoms referred to in article 87 of navigation and overflight and of the
laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful
uses of the sea related to these freedoms, such as those associated with
the operation of ships, aircraft and submarine cables and pipelines, and
compatible with the other provisions of this Convention.
2. Articles 88 to 115 and other pertinent rules of international law apply
to the exclusive economic zone in so far as they are not incompatible with
this Part.
3. In exercising their rights and performing their duties under this Con-
vention in the exclusive economic zone, States shall have due regard to
the rights and duties of the coastal State and shall comply with the laws
and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with the provi-
sions of this Convention and other rules of international law in so far as
they are not incompatible with this Part. 6 9
In order to carry out its qualitative purpose, paragraph 1 of arti-
cle 58 identifies the safeguarded freedoms as those "referred to in
Article 87," which is captioned "Freedom of the High Seas."70 The
quantitative purpose is emphasized by the phrase "such as,"
which makes clear that the reference to specific uses is illustra-
tive but not exhaustive. Again, article 87 defines "Freedom of the
High Seas" by setting forth a list of freedoms whose non-exhaus-
tive character is made clear by the prefatory phrase "inter alia."7
69. Id. art. 58.
70. Id. art. 87.
71. Id. art. 87 which reads as follows:
Freedom of the High Seas
1. The high seas are open to all btates, whether coastal or land-locked.
Freedom of the high seas is exercised under the conditions laid down by
this Convention and by other rules of international law. It comprises, in-
ter alia, both for coastal and land-locked States:
(a) freedom of navigation;
The inclusiveness of article 58 with respect to both the quality
and quantity of the freedoms thereby safeguarded is further rein-
forced by the phrase, "other internationally lawful uses of the sea
related to these freedoms," which is not only its common-sense
meaning but the one intended for it by the bargaining process
from which it emerged.
The substantive attributes of the freedoms enjoyed by all
States in the exclusive economic zone derive their content not
only from article 58, paragraph 1, and from the provisions of arti-
cle 87, absorbed by the cross-reference to that article, but gain ad-
ditional content from the other paragraphs of article 58. Thus the
zone, like the high seas, must be reserved for "peaceful pur-
poses," a phrase intended to enjoin observance in those areas of
the Charter of the United Nations.72 Military maneuvers and ac-
tivites that do not violate the Charter are permitted; and the fact
that a particular coastal State may have a low threshold of anxi-
ety regarding ships and aircraft off its coast cannot diminish the
rights of the flag State, although the latter must pay due regard to
the rights and duties of the coastal State.73 As article 58, para-
graph 3 makes clear, the freedoms of other States are not subject
to the exercise of the rights of the coastal State, except as specifi-
cally provided for in the Convention with respect, for example, to
compliance with international pollution standards.
The essence of the compromise between the maritime States'
position, that the exclusive economic zone should be regarded as
a part of the high seas subject to certain coastal States rights, and
the coastal States' position, that it should be regarded as sui
generis, is most clearly revealed in article 86. The first sentence
of that article declares that Part VI, captioned "High Seas," gov-
erns "all parts of the sea that are not included in the exclusive ec-
(b) freedom of overflight
(c) freedom to lay submarine cables and pipelines, subject to Part
VI;
(d) freedom to construct artificial islands and other installations per-
mitted under international law, subject to Part VI1
(e) freedom of fishing, subject to the conditions laid down in section
2;
(f) freedom of scientific research, subject to Parts VI and XIII.
2. These freedoms shall be exercised by all States with due regard for
the interests of other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high
seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this Convention with
respect to activities in the Area.
72. Id. art. 88, incorporated by art. 58, para. 2.
73. Id. art. 56, para. 2.
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onomic zone.... ."74 Lest this sentence be interpreted, however,
as implying some difference between the character and scope of
high-seas freedoms and those enjoyed by other States in the ex-
clusive economic zone, the next sentence was added for the spe-
cific purpose of precluding any such implication. It reads, '"Tis
article does not entail any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed
by all States in the exclusive economic zone in accordance with
article 58.''75
In sum, the provisions are geared to deal with the complexities
which have resulted from new and more intensive use of the
oceans. Where both coastal States and other States have rights,
there are detailed provisions governing the resolution of the prob-
lem and a "due regard" clause for the accommodation of these
rights where more specific provisions may not be applicable; it is
a rule of reason.
But should an unforeseen use of the sea become apparent
which is attributed neither to coastal States nor to other States
and should a conflict arise between the interests of those States,
article 59 provides that "the conflict should be resolved on the ba-
sis of equity and in the light of all the relevant circumstances, tak-
ing into account the respective importance of the interests
involved to the parties as well as to the international community
as a whole." 76 Since no one can predict the future, the Conven-
tion broadly spells out the criteria to be employed in resolving
such conflicts. Beyond the economic zone, the traditional high-
seas freedoms obtain, subject to limitations of international law
including a degree of regard for the rights of others.
74. The key provision is as follows:
PART VII
HIGH SEAS
SECTION 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 86
Application of he- provisions of this Part
The provisions of this Part apply to all parts of the sea that are not in-
cluded in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the in-
ternal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic
State. This article does not entail any abridgement of the freedoms en-
joyed by all States in the exclusive economic zone in accordance with arti-
cle 58.
Id.; see also note 71 supra.
75. Draft Convention, supra note 3, art. 86.
76. Id. art. 59.
CONCLUSION
The Draft Convention as it relates to navigation and overflight
and related uses of the seas is a considerable improvement over
existing law. The existing law of the sea does not command a
global consensus. Its rules are neither clear nor authoritative.
They are poorly understood in consequence by those at the seat
of power, by those who must operate at sea, and by the public at
large. Those who set store by law and order at home cannot dis-
regard the importance of agreed law at sea.
Foreign perceptions of the applicable principles of international
law can affect both the willingness and the ability of the United
States to carry out various missions at sea. A law of the sea
treaty creating a widely accepted system of international law for
the oceans, including the Draft Convention's navigation and re-
lated provisions, would-if the other rules it contains adequately
meet United States needs-be the most effective means of creat-
ing a legal environment in which our own perception of our rights
is essentially unchallenged. We would then, for the first time
since the Grotian system began to disintegrate, be assured rights
of navigation and overflight free of foreign control, free of sub-
stantial military risk, and free of economic or political cost.
